The Elite Eight: Lyle Berman Vs. Phil Hellmuth - The National Heads-Up Poker Championshipby Phil Hellmuth | Published: Jul 26, 2005 |
 
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In recent columns, I have been covering the National Heads-Up Poker Championship matches that I played. After advancing past Men Nguyen, Paul Phillips, and former World Champion Huck Seed (in the Sweet 16), I was now staring down Lyle Berman. In addition to being a founder of the World Poker Tour, Grand Casinos, and Lakes Gaming, and a principal in Rainforest Cafes, Berman has been playing in the biggest side games for more than 20 years. And when I won the 1989 World Series of Poker championship event, Lyle was among the final six, along with 1988 reigning World Champion Johnny Chan and future World Champion Noel Furlong.
Early on in the match, Lyle and I were both playing a conservative style, feeling each other out, and I managed to make a few hands. In one of those early hands, I limped in with the 10
8 and Lyle raised it a relatively steep $4,000 - we had started with $160,000 apiece - into the $2,500 pot. For whatever reason, I decided to see the flop.
The flop was 10
10 8, Lyle checked, and I bet $3,000 into the $10,000 pot, holding the nuts. Of course, I was hoping to get raised. Without any hesitation, Lyle raised it $12,000 more (to $15,000 total). Rather than smooth-calling - which would have been a good play, as well - I decided that I didn't want to merely call, for several reasons.
First, I didn't want to see Lyle hit his card that cheaply if he had an overpair (like a jack if he held J-J), or a 10 with an overcard (like a king if he had K-10), and bust me. Second, if Lyle did have a 10, I would almost certainly win all or most of his chips with a reraise. Third, if he had a big pair, he might move all in with it, or at least call a big reraise. Fourth, he could have had a flush draw and might have gambled with it for all of his chips, not knowing that I already had flopped a full house.
So, I announced, "I raise." I called his $12,000 and raised $25,000 more. Lyle folded fairly quickly, which told me he had nothing. If that was the case, a call could have been much better. After all, Lyle could have made a backdoor straight or a backdoor flush, or perhaps simply paired an over card (like a queen coming off to his K-Q). In any case, I now had about $30,000 of his chips, which left the count at about $190,000 to $130,000 in my favor.
About 20 minutes later, another key hand came up. I had 9-7 in the big blind, Lyle called, and the flop came down 10 8 6. I decided to bet out $1,600, Lyle raised it to about $6,000, and I reraised to $18,000 to go. Lyle studied awhile, and called. At this point, it appeared to me that Lyle had been thinking of reraising me, which made me leery that he might have flopped two pair. Of course, I saw the flush-draw possibility, as well.
The next card was the 10
, making the board 10 8 6 10, and I checked like a scared duck. Lyle bet $30,000, and I was in a quandary. He had about $55,000 left. I decided that I wasn't folding, that much was certain. But, I didn't want to move all in, have him call me quickly, and then find out that I was drawing dead for all of those chips. After a moment, I decided to make the hybrid play of just calling. This way, I had some flexibility. If a blank came off and Lyle moved all in, my move would have to depend on my read. If a third 10 came off and Lyle moved all in, again, it would all depend on my read (in that case, I could beat only a pure bluff). It was also possible, of course, that my call on the turn would induce another bluff on the end.
On the downside, by merely calling his $30,000 bet, I was giving Lyle a "free" shot at making the winning hand. If he had an 8 for two pair, he could hit a 10 or an 8 to win. If he had a flush draw, he could hit any club to win. Or, if he had a higher straight draw, he could hit his card to beat me. If I knew for certain that Lyle was on a draw, it clearly would be correct to move all in to protect my hand.
Lyle told me a few weeks later that he was drawing, with the J 4. Had I been privy to that knowledge, my not moving him all in would have been a mistake. In any case, the last card was the 5. I checked, and Lyle checked, and that was that.
After another 20 minutes, with Lyle getting very low on chips, I limped in with K-Q. The flop was K J
5, Lyle checked, and I bet about 75 percent of the pot size. Lyle went ahead and raised it half of his remaining chips. I moved all in, and he called me; J-6 for Lyle and K-Q for me. I was thinking, "Turn a king and end this thing." The turn was a king, and I was through to the "Final Four," where Antonio Esfandiari was waiting for me. On the other side of the draw, it would be former World Champion Chris "Jesus" Ferguson and T.J. Cloutier in a rematch of the 2000 WSOP finals. There was heavy freight there either way, if fate were to carry me that far.
Parts I, II, and III of this series can be found at www.CardPlayer.com.
Early on in the match, Lyle and I were both playing a conservative style, feeling each other out, and I managed to make a few hands. In one of those early hands, I limped in with the 10
8 and Lyle raised it a relatively steep $4,000 - we had started with $160,000 apiece - into the $2,500 pot. For whatever reason, I decided to see the flop.The flop was 10
10 8, Lyle checked, and I bet $3,000 into the $10,000 pot, holding the nuts. Of course, I was hoping to get raised. Without any hesitation, Lyle raised it $12,000 more (to $15,000 total). Rather than smooth-calling - which would have been a good play, as well - I decided that I didn't want to merely call, for several reasons.First, I didn't want to see Lyle hit his card that cheaply if he had an overpair (like a jack if he held J-J), or a 10 with an overcard (like a king if he had K-10), and bust me. Second, if Lyle did have a 10, I would almost certainly win all or most of his chips with a reraise. Third, if he had a big pair, he might move all in with it, or at least call a big reraise. Fourth, he could have had a flush draw and might have gambled with it for all of his chips, not knowing that I already had flopped a full house.
So, I announced, "I raise." I called his $12,000 and raised $25,000 more. Lyle folded fairly quickly, which told me he had nothing. If that was the case, a call could have been much better. After all, Lyle could have made a backdoor straight or a backdoor flush, or perhaps simply paired an over card (like a queen coming off to his K-Q). In any case, I now had about $30,000 of his chips, which left the count at about $190,000 to $130,000 in my favor.
About 20 minutes later, another key hand came up. I had 9-7 in the big blind, Lyle called, and the flop came down 10
8 6. I decided to bet out $1,600, Lyle raised it to about $6,000, and I reraised to $18,000 to go. Lyle studied awhile, and called. At this point, it appeared to me that Lyle had been thinking of reraising me, which made me leery that he might have flopped two pair. Of course, I saw the flush-draw possibility, as well.The next card was the 10
, making the board 10 8 6 10, and I checked like a scared duck. Lyle bet $30,000, and I was in a quandary. He had about $55,000 left. I decided that I wasn't folding, that much was certain. But, I didn't want to move all in, have him call me quickly, and then find out that I was drawing dead for all of those chips. After a moment, I decided to make the hybrid play of just calling. This way, I had some flexibility. If a blank came off and Lyle moved all in, my move would have to depend on my read. If a third 10 came off and Lyle moved all in, again, it would all depend on my read (in that case, I could beat only a pure bluff). It was also possible, of course, that my call on the turn would induce another bluff on the end.On the downside, by merely calling his $30,000 bet, I was giving Lyle a "free" shot at making the winning hand. If he had an 8 for two pair, he could hit a 10 or an 8 to win. If he had a flush draw, he could hit any club to win. Or, if he had a higher straight draw, he could hit his card to beat me. If I knew for certain that Lyle was on a draw, it clearly would be correct to move all in to protect my hand.
Lyle told me a few weeks later that he was drawing, with the J
4. Had I been privy to that knowledge, my not moving him all in would have been a mistake. In any case, the last card was the 5. I checked, and Lyle checked, and that was that.After another 20 minutes, with Lyle getting very low on chips, I limped in with K-Q. The flop was K
J 5, Lyle checked, and I bet about 75 percent of the pot size. Lyle went ahead and raised it half of his remaining chips. I moved all in, and he called me; J-6 for Lyle and K-Q for me. I was thinking, "Turn a king and end this thing." The turn was a king, and I was through to the "Final Four," where Antonio Esfandiari was waiting for me. On the other side of the draw, it would be former World Champion Chris "Jesus" Ferguson and T.J. Cloutier in a rematch of the 2000 WSOP finals. There was heavy freight there either way, if fate were to carry me that far. Parts I, II, and III of this series can be found at www.CardPlayer.com.
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