Even the best players in the world make mistakes. Join Sam Greenwood as he breaks down and analyzes hands played from the high roller circuit on his Punt Of The Day Substack.
My 2019 World Series of Poker main event bustout might be the most watched hand I’ve ever played. There are a lot of airport bars that have ESPN on a 24/7 loop, and over time that adds up to a lot of eyeballs watching Timothy Su crack my aces.
With all due respect to Timothy Su, I believe that I am the main character of that hand. After all, I’m the guy whose main event hopes were dashed and whose aces got cracked. Whenever there is a viral hand involving aces, the audience tends to identify with the player who has aces. These factors make that hand the most-viewed hand I played where I am the hero.
In this column, however, we are going to talk about a hand where Vladimir “Gambledore” Korzinin was the hero, and I was just cannon fodder.
I’ve never won a Triton event, but I’ve had many close calls. I’ve finished second three times, and, not to complain too much, but I’ve had many other final tables where I had a big stack, only to lose some key all-ins and finish off the podium.
Before this particular final table began, I was interviewed about the Triton monkey on my back, and thought to myself that a $150,000 event with over 100 runners would be a pretty damn good way to end the streak.
Finishing eighth was simply not on my radar, even though deep down I knew it was a possibility. Well, sometimes the cards get dealt in such a way where you’re forced to play a really big pot, even if you don’t want to. That’s what happened to me in Monaco, and it’s why I’m still hunting for that first Triton title.
Event: 2024 Triton Monte Carlo $150,000 No-Limit Hold’em
The Hand
There are eight players remaining from a field of 121 and we are in the money, sitting on a stack of 4,590,000. The blinds are 50,000-100,000 with a 100,000 big blind ante. I am sitting on a stack of 4,590,000, which is good for second place.
Chip leader Vladimir Korzinin (5,555,000) raises to 200,000 from middle position and it folds to me in the big blind. I look down at A♣5♣ and make the call.
Flop: 10♣4♣2♦ (pot: 550,000)
I check, and Vladimir bets 750,000. I move all in for 4,390,000, and he calls with Q♣Q♠.
Turn: 8♥ (pot: 9,330,000)
River: K♥ (pot: 9,330,000)
I miss everything, and bust in eighth place for $562,000. Vladimir would go on to win for $4,350,000, and kick start the legend of ‘Gambledore.’
What Was I Thinking?
I was unsure what the bottom of my value range would be preflop in this situation, but I think I would probably call Q-Q and A-K vs. Vladimir, a recreational player who plays poorly post-flop, will have linear preflop aggression, and is more likely to four-bet shove A-Q suited than A-2 suited.
I would still have some bluffs here, just so my entire range isn’t K-K+, but they would be polar, and a suited ace is not a hand I’d want to three-bet bluff.
On the flop, I checked and faced a large overbet. Two notable hands from earlier in the tournament had stuck with me.
The previous night, Thomas Boivin raised the cutoff with 28 big blinds (bbs). Vladimir had 55 bbs and three-bet to 8.5 bbs on the button. He then folded to a shove with 8-8. I’d seen many of these types of plays from him, where he made an oversized bet with a linear, middle-of-range type hand, and then folded to aggression.
The other hand on my mind occurred minutes earlier, when Vladimir busted Thomas. He raised the hijack with Q♠10♠, and Thomas called in the big blind. The flop was A♠9♦5♣ and it checked through. The turn was the 5♠, and Thomas bet two-thirds pot. Vladimir shoved for around 1.5x pot with his bare flush draw and cracked Thomas’s trips, which is how Vladimir found himself with the chip lead eight-handed.
Vladimir is an unpredictable player whose play style often depends on his mood. The previous night, I saw him make a big fold when facing a shove for a large proportion of this stack. Then at the final table, I saw him miss a pure continuation bet and then make a big shove with a draw.
Does that mean he was more willing to gamble? It’s unclear, and I have at times struggled to get a read on him.
In the moment, I thought his overall betting strategy would be too linear, his average bet size too large, and that he would be capable of making some relatively large folds. In this hand, I was not sure if he’d fold top pair, but thought he’d certainly fold smaller pairs and better ace highs. And I thought I’d be facing a lot of turn aggression and didn’t want to risk check-folding my hand on the turn, so I shoved the flop.
At the time, I remember thinking my shove was akin to four-bet shoving A-K offsuit preflop. 170% is a large shove post-flop, but a normal sized one preflop. Also, I’ll always have around 50% equity when called, which is usually not the case when you have A-K offsuit.
I also considered some sort of dream scenario, where he calls a shove with Qc Jc and occasionally folds top pair. I thought I’d have enough fold equity to shove and went for it.
What Did I Get Wrong?
I can start with a key piece of information that I missed, which Fedor Holz kindly informed me of during the Triton Jeju series. Fedor told me that he had a live read that Vladimir was strong from the moment he opened preflop. No alarm bells went off for me, however, and I’ve generally found it tough to read Vladimir. It’s also possible he’d give off strength with a less strong hand like K-Q suited. Fedor’s live reads aren’t flawless, but they are strong, and armed with that knowledge I would have just called the flop.
The solver prefers min check-raising to shoving with range, but playing that strategy would be the wrong exploit vs. Vladimir. The solver likes occasionally minraise/folding and getting extra value when it has a set or two pair.
This is a unique enough spot that I want to pick the highest-expected value (EV) play and am not interested in maximizing the EV with my range if I had a set. I want to find the best play with A♣5♣. In this case, shoving to make sure Vladimir folds a hand like A-K or 8-8 is what I should be aiming for if I pick an aggressive action.
The main thing I got wrong was comparing my hand to A-K offsuit. My hand is similar in that it has some good blocker value and has good but not great equity when all-in and called. However, like I’ve written about previously, I have a hand that runs very hot and cold.
When I make my hand, I will have the nuts or close to it. When I miss my hand, I will rarely have the best hand. A reason to shove A-K offsuit preflop is because there will be a lot of boards where A-K high is the best hand, but it will be tough to play future streets. A-5 high will rarely be the best hand, but a flush, a straight, or a pair with flush and straight draws will almost always be hands I can stack off.
A good rule of thumb in solver poker is, the more linear your opponent’s range is, the more linear your range needs to be. A-5 suited becomes a much less attractive bluff-shove vs. someone who is always three-bet/calling A-J suited than against someone who is always three-bet/folding A-10 offsuit. Similarly, A-Q suited becomes a much more attractive four-bet shove vs. someone stacking off A-J suited preflop.
However, in this hand we’re in an unusual spot, facing a player who might be too linear but is doing the equivalent of three-bet/folding A-J suited. Which means if I want to play a more balanced strategy against an unbalanced opponent, my most frequent bluff-shoves will be draws that are lower-EV calls.
In theory, that might include some king- and queen-high flush draws, but I want to avoid those shoves against someone like Vladimir, who could bet-call ace-high flush draws. That’s not a concern when I have the nut flush draw myself, but A♣5♣ is robust enough that it doesn’t need to bluff shove and I can bluff slightly more polar with lower EV nut flush draws that have trouble playing turns, like A♣6♣.
For this shove to be breakeven, ICM says I need to get Vladimir to fold 80% of the time when I have around 50% equity when called. I think given how he fast-plays draws, I’d probably have more than 50% equity when called, but I don’t think I’d get 80% folds.
I am also supposed to have about 70% vs. his betting range, but I don’t think his overbet range is nearly as polar as the solver, and I don’t think I’d have that much equity vs. his betting range which lowers the EV of just calling.
However, I also think my EV in calling and seeing a turn is much higher against Vladimir than the solver. Vladimir is much more likely to make a six-figure mistake on the turn or the river than the solver is.
The two exploits that point in favor of my shove are that I have worse equity vs. his betting range and I have better equity when called, which seems counter-intuitive, but I think I laid out the case for.
The two exploits that point against me are that I don’t think I am generating folds as often as the solver, and I’m gaining a lot more EV on the turn and on the river.
Types Of Errors I Made
- Too Much Money
- ICM Is For Rich People
Grade
The preflop spot I compared this to was four-bet shoving A-K offsuit, but conceptually, it also has a lot in common with four-bet shoving Q-Q. I don’t have great blocker value, I have a very strong hand, and I’m doing okay if I get all in preflop. But it is usually very clear which boards are good for my hand, and instead of playing a big pot right away, I’d rather wait for a favorable runout.
I mentioned that my preflop value range was K-K+, and then post-flop I ended up getting all in with a hand that shared qualities with Q-Q and A-K.
I’ve had almost a year to stew over this hand, and I still believe that shove is better than a minraise. I’ve been convinced that my hand is a little too strong to shove over the flop raise, but I do believe Vladimir is the right opponent to do it against, and doing so cannot lose a substantial amount of EV.
Despite the disaster of busting in eighth, this hand I’m giving myself a B-.

- Photo by Triton
