When you read some of the works by David Sklansky and Mason Malmuth, you might come across the term "compounding error." Even though the authors explain the meaning of this term very well, lots of people still don't seem to understand it (possibly because they have not read the books). My definition of compounding error is: "a mistake that may seem quite harmless at first glance, but may not be so harmless after all" or, better: "a call early in a hand that may not seem that bad, but will cause you to make mistakes on the later streets because of that first call." In this column, I'll provide an example of such a call, the implications on the later streets, and the thought processes that may, or may not, occur inside the caller's head.
A Compounding Error in Practice
One of the situations in which a compounding error might take place is when you're in the big blind. Let's say you're in the big blind with 10-8 offsuit, and the button raises. Also, there were two limpers, and you decide to call the raise.
One of the main considerations in deciding whether or not to defend your blind is your estimation of your opponents' hands (especially the raiser's). You know that if the raiser has a big pair in the hole, you are in extremely bad shape with your 10-8. If you think the raiser doesn't need to have a premium hand, and especially if you think he doesn't need to have a big pair (or if you think you can outplay him after the flop; however, we will assume that this is not the case here), you would be more inclined to defend your blind. If you think the raiser and the limpers are playing big cards rather than big pairs, your hand has some value (because it is live due to the fact that you are playing cards that are opposite to theirs, and because you know that when small cards flop, you can put pressure on your opponents). This means that if you want to play well, you should defend only if you think that flopping a 10 or 8 with no bigger cards on the board will give you a reasonable chance to have the best hand. The implication from all of this is that if the flop comes 8-7-3 rainbow, for example, and the limpers don't seem very interested in the pot, you are going to assume your hand is the best at the moment, until proven otherwise. So, you will try to find the best way to (a) defend your top pair, (b) make as much money as possible when your hand is good, and (c) lose as little as possible when it's not. This might mean checking and calling (to give the raiser the chance to bluff off his money with his big or semibig cards), check-raising (to get the limpers out and play the hand heads up against the button), or simply betting out (to put pressure on the limpers and to represent more strength than you actually have). Either way, you are going to put lots of bets in with your extremely vulnerable top pair/weak kicker, because you judge it unlikely that the raiser has a big pair in the hole. Now, if the raiser is the type of player who raises only with big pairs (A-A, K-K, Q-Q) and just calls with hands like A-K, A-Q, or K-Q, defending your blind before the flop will be an expensive mistake, because you will get into trouble on the later streets.
The game: $10-$20 hold'em
Your hand: 10-8 offsuit in the big blind
The other players: a button raiser with a big pair in the hole, and two limpers with big cards
The flop: 8-7-3 rainbow
Pot size: $85
Your reasoning: Hey, I've got top pair, and there's $85 in the pot already. Most people would check to the raiser, but I've read Sklansky's books and therefore know that automatically checking to the raiser isn't good poker. I'm not sure if my hand is good right now, so I think I'm simply going to bet out to see what happens (other possibilities would have been going for the check-raise, or the weak player's favorite, the check-call).
The actions: You bet, the limpers call, and the button raises.
Your reasoning: I might be beat, but then again, the button might still be pushing his overcards here, or maybe he's playing his position, going for the free card on the turn. However, I've got the limpers beat for sure. I cannot possibly fold. Even if the button has the big pair he's representing, I have five cards (three tens, two eights) that will improve my hand over his; there is $135 in the pot already and it costs me only $10 to call. (A very aggressive player might even reason: Hey, I'll reraise to push the limpers out, get some dead money in the pot, and play the hand heads up. Even if I'm behind, I cannot be that far behind).
The actions: You call, one limper folds, and the other calls.
Pot size: $155
The turn: 2 (no flushes possible)
Your reasoning: This deuce certainly hasn't helped my opponents. The button may have raised on the flop with just overcards or some sort of draw, so this deuce can be considered a "good" card for me. The button might have been going for the free card here, but I'm not going to let him have that. I'm going to bet into him again.
The actions: You bet, the limper folds – and now the button raises again!
Your reasoning: Damn! He must have me beat after all! He cannot be bluffing in this situation, can he? Or can he? How much is in the pot right now? Let's see. There's $215 in the middle already; if I call it's $235, and I still have five outs if in fact the button has the hand he's representing. Five cards out of 44 give me a certain winner, and it's only $20 extra. Hmm, with the pot this big, I simply have to call; I cannot possibly fold.
Pot size: $235
The river: 2
The actions: You check, and the button bets again.
Your reasoning: I must be beat. It is extremely unlikely that he is still betting his overcards here. But then again, he might have raised before the flop with 9-8 suited or maybe J-10, and been semibluffing all the way. Or, maybe he is still betting his overcards. Either way, it costs me only $20 and there is $255 in the pot already. I don't have to be right a high percentage of the time to give this call a positive expectation. OK, so maybe it's a crying call, but I cannot risk folding the winner: I cannot possibly pass with the pot this big.
And then, of course, your opponent shows you the big pair he has been representing all along, and you knew it, because he always has a big pair when he raises. Now, that's the essence of the compounding error. You know you've got the worst hand going in, and then you receive a little help – although not enough to beat your opponent – and convince yourself on every street that folding isn't the right thing to do – that the odds dictate you've got to take off another card, or that you've got to make that call. And maybe you're even right here; maybe it is right to make these calls. However, if you had simply folded your hand before the flop, you wouldn't have put yourself in the situation you're in right now: chasing with the worst hand.
Some Final Words
A couple of other situations in which compounding errors are likely are calling a raise with inadequate values, a problem hand, or a hand that is likely to be dominated, or always completing your small blind "because it's only half a bet." If you analyze your play very well, you will probably find that you lost the most money in situations you wouldn't have been in had you just done the right thing before the flop (fold). Be careful of making automatic "it's only $X more" calls early in a hand: They will tend to get you into trouble on the later streets, when the real money is at stake.