Sometimes, a player makes such a series of interesting plays in a hand that it deserves a thorough review. Let's look at such a hand from two perspectives, mine and that of an expert player, Neil. I found Neil's plays to be far different from the way a typical player would play the hand, and his reasons for those plays to be highly insightful.
In an $80-$160 hold'em game at Bellagio, we had an unusual player. One of the things that makes poker a terrific game is that the presence of one new player in an otherwise regular lineup can change everything about the game. In this case, the player is a frequent bluffer (FB). Usually, when an FB sits down, he wins a few pots before the players at the table work out what kind of game he plays. Once they understand that he's a bluffer, the most common adjustment they make is to call him down much more often. That's fine as far as it goes, but there are other much more radical adjustments that they can and perhaps should make.
This FB's primary characteristic is that he will virtually always bluff on the turn if nobody bets the flop. This tendency can be exploited in a number of ways, and in this hand, the players involved (Neil and I) tried to take full advantage of it.
You may not like all of the plays (or any of the plays) that either of us made. We both had reasons for the actions we took, and they were made with careful thought. It is quite possible that any of these plays could be argued for some time. My purpose is to show you what sort of thinking goes on in the mind of an expert player (Neil), and how decisions are made.
I am in middle position with the Au 4u. FB is the big blind. Neil is in early position and just calls the blind. Everyone else folds to me. Now, normally with this hand I might raise to isolate the limper, possibly drive out a better ace, and try to get heads up. However, I do not want to isolate Neil, because he is an excellent player (I make money isolating poor players, not experts). In addition, I do not want to raise FB out of the pot, because I may be able to use his turn-bluff tendency. I also do not want to fold, even though this is a marginal hand, for similar reasons. I want to be in pots with FB, as he is willing to take far the worst of it quite often. So, I call, and we also get the small blind (SB) calling.
The flop is A
4
2. Great, I have flopped two pair, and everyone checks to me. Under most circumstances, this is an automatic bet. Not only do I have the best hand, but there is also a two-flush and possible gutshot straight on the board. A free card is dangerous, and I should not want to give one. As I am last to act, my bet might not even be read as my having a particularly good hand, and I might get extra action. I am influenced by two other factors, however. First, if I check, FB will surely bet the turn and give me the chance to raise. Second, Neil did not bet. Since he knows that FB will bet the turn, he will probably bet with any flush draw on the flop to keep FB from betting through him. FB does not have a flush draw or he would have bet the flop (since he enjoys betting so much). So, the free card in this situation is not as dangerous as it might be in any other, given that at least two of my three opponents almost certainly do not have a four-flush. I decide to check.
The turn is the Ju. The SB checks and FB, naturally, bets. Somewhat to my surprise, Neil calls. I go ahead and raise, which was my plan. Now, a very surprising thing (to me) happens. After the SB folds, FB calls and Neil folds. Gee, I guess FB has something this time. And what could Neil have had to check the flop, flat-call the obvious bluff on the turn, and then fold to my raise? If he had anything, I would expect him to have raised the turn after FB's presumable bluff. In a few moments, we will get to Neil's hand and his logic.
The river card is a 9. This looks harmless, and I bet when FB checks. He calls and I win the pot. FB shows K-J, so he really did have something on the turn. Note that the presence of FB in the game not only changed my game plan for my hand, it also changed my reads.
Now, let's get back to Neil. In this hand, he had the A
8. (No, I am not clairvoyant – not that I will admit, anyway. Neil and I discussed this hand later; that's how I know what he had and what he thought.) Before the flop, he limped in with a hand he might normally fold. Like me, his reason was that FB would be in the pot, and he might gain some extra advantage from his predictability. When the flop comes with an ace (A-4-2), he decides to check. His reasoning is that FB will bet the turn no matter what, and he can then raise the field out and win the pot, which was enriched by FB's bet. Note that the pot here is only four small bets, which makes it worthwhile to try to win a bet (or several) more. After I check, the turn is a jack, and FB bets. Neil calls. Why doesn't he stick with his original plan and raise? First, he knows I do not have a flush draw, for the same reason I knew he did not have one. With the board A-4-2-J, there is also no possible open-end straight draw. Thus, if he flat-calls, I will be getting 4-1 for my call, and there is no draw out there that will be offering me those odds. So, if I (or the SB) call with a draw, I will be making a mistake, and that is good for him. Similarly, if I call with a jack, or other pair, I will have five outs (8-1) at best, and I again will be making an error. That all being the case, there is no reason for him to raise at this time. He would rather induce an error.
But after he calls, I raise. It now comes back to him, with FB calling the raise. While this is a surprise to him, he reasons as follows: Can Barry have a pair with a flush draw? No. With a flush draw, I would have bet the flop for the reasons we covered before. Can Barry have a jack, and have just made a pair of jacks? No, because Neil called the turn; therefore, Barry must know Neil can beat a jack! Barry knows Neil can't have a draw (no odds) or a jack (would have raised). So, Neil knows Barry knows Neil must have an ace or better. But Barry raised. The most likely hand for Barry is a small set (4-4 or 2-2), with which he checked the flop to get the extra bet from FB. It is also possible that Barry has two pair, but a set is highly likely, and would leave Neil drawing dead. So, having worked this out, he folds.
So, there it is. One bluffer not only changes the game, he also enters into the analyses of the players involved on every street, since both good players assume the other player is also playing the tendencies of the frequent bluffer. It also points out why the answer to almost every "How should you play this hand?" question is, "It depends." In this case, the player who is in the blind changes how people play the hand preflop, as well as the thinking post-flop.
Although from a distance this looked like a normal, boring hand, I found the analysis interesting and thought you might learn some good lessons from it. I hope you did.