Similar situations: Both of the hands that follow occurred at final tables (the first at Bellagio's Five Diamond Poker Classic and the second at the last Tournament of Champions). In each case, the game was no-limit hold'em and the antes and blinds were large.
In the first hand, Freddie Deeb made a substantial raise (nearly half of his chips) with two tens, and was reraised by Johnny "World" Hennigan. Johnny "World" had been raising lots of pots and was certainly in the gambling mode. The reraise put Freddie all in if he called, and if he lost, he would be out of the tournament.
In the second case, I had two tens in late position, and "Miami" John Cernuto, on my right, raised all in. If I called and lost, I would have enough chips for a few antes and blinds. "Miami" John had been playing very tight. The only hand he had shown down at the final table had been pocket aces.
Two tens crush a bluff, a smaller pair, or a combination like A-X suited where X is a 10 or lower. The tens are a slight, around 6-to-5, favorite against two overcards. They are a big underdog to a higher pair.
The decisions: Both Freddie and I folded. Freddie decided that his opponent had to have an overpair to take such a strong action. I thought my opponent could have an overpair or two overcards. Thus, I would be a huge underdog or a small favorite. I also had a couple of players behind me who hadn't acted yet, and one of them might have woken up with a big hand.
The result: Johnny "World" said he had an overpair. Freddie's good fold led to his finishing several places higher in the tournament. Great play, Freddie!
"Miami" John showed 5-2 offsuit, a complete bluff. I was eliminated a few hands later when my two sevens lost to two eights, after I flopped a set and my opponent made a flush. Stupid play, Zee! Why was Freddie's play brilliant and mine hopeless? There are two classes of reasons, the psychological and the technical, and both present interesting lessons.
The psychological lesson: First, let's look at the psychological reasons. Both Johnny "World" and "Miami" John are talented, expert players. They both knew the image they had been presenting to the table. Everyone knew "World" was ramming and jamming. Everyone knew "Miami" was playing a rock solid game. They knew that everyone knew it. "World" knew it was unlikely that he could get away with a bluff. He had to have a real hand. But Freddie knew, that too. Nice read, Freddie. "Miami" thought he had a reasonable chance of getting away with a bluff. While I considered this possibility, I had no reason to suspect that this was the hand he had decided to capitalize on his tight image.
If you have presented a consistent image for some period of time, expect your opponents to assume you're continuing to play in that manner and to react accordingly. But with great players, remember that they may anticipate your expectations and try to double-cross you.
The technical lesson: There is a big difference between making the first raise and reraising after someone else has raised. The initial raiser has no reason to suspect that there are good hands out against him. This is especially true when the raise comes from late position. He may easily win it right there. Therefore, an initial raise may be made with a mix of great hands, good hands, and bluffs. A reraiser knows that someone has a hand good enough to raise with. Yes, the reraiser could be bluffing, but he is more likely to have a good or great hand than a random player. Therefore, it takes a much better hand to call a reraise than to call a first raise.
In the late rounds of a no-limit hold'em tournament when the antes and blinds are high, calling a first raise with a moderately good hand like tens is reasonable (but by no means clear). Calling a double-raise cold is almost certainly wrong. Calling a reraise after you have made the first raise is often wrong. But as we all know, you have to be at the table and know your opponent.